数据与计算发展前沿 ›› 2026, Vol. 8 ›› Issue (1): 14-26.

CSTR: 32002.14.jfdc.CN10-1649/TP.2026.01.002

doi: 10.11871/jfdc.issn.2096-742X.2026.01.002

• 专刊:计算金融 • 上一篇    下一篇

智能合约赋能预付款监管的动力学分析——基于支付选择视角

朱晓玲(),朱建明*()   

  1. 中央财经大学,信息学院,北京 112200
  • 收稿日期:2025-02-27 出版日期:2026-02-20 发布日期:2026-02-02
  • 通讯作者: 朱建明
  • 作者简介:朱晓玲,中央财经大学,信息学院,博士研究生,主要研究方向为央行数字货币。
    本文中负责框架搭建与初稿撰写。
    ZHU Xiaoling, Doctoral Candidate, School of Information, Central University of Finance and Economics. Her main research interest is Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC).
    In this paper, she is responsible for the framework construction and the initial manuscript.
    E-mail: 2021110187@email.cufe.edu.cn|朱建明,中央财经大学,信息学院,博士生导师,主要研究方向为信息安全、区块链、金融科技等。
    本文中负责把握文章总体方向与论文修订。
    ZHU Jianming, Ph.D. Supervisor, School of Information, Central University of Finance and Economics. His main research interests include information security, blockchain, and financial technology.
    In this paper, he is responsible for overall guidance and the paper revision.
    E-mail: zjm@cufe.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家重点研发计划项目(2017YFB1400700)

Dynamics Analysis of Smart Contract Enabled Advance Payment Regulation—Based on Payment Choice Perspective

ZHU Xiaoling(),ZHU Jianming*()   

  1. School of Information, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 112200, China
  • Received:2025-02-27 Online:2026-02-20 Published:2026-02-02
  • Contact: ZHU Jianming

摘要:

【目的】在支付选择视角下,探讨消费者、商家、政府在智能合约应用预付式消费市场不同阶段的策略演化规则,对于防范资金挪用与监管资金去向的长效机制具有重要意义。【方法】以消费者支付预付款方式为切入点,构建消费者、商家、政府之间的三方演化博弈模型,利用Matlab 2021a对博弈系统均衡策略组合的稳定性以及参数的影响关系进行仿真分析。【结果】本文研究表明:在智能合约应用预付式消费市场的不同情景下,演化系统分别朝着{传统支付、不跑路、宽松监管}、{传统支付、不跑路、严格监管}、{CBDC支付、不跑路、严格监管}演化并最终稳定,仿真结果进一步验证了不同阶段演化均衡点的稳定性。【结论】政府部门采取更加灵活和动态的平台监管措施,并引导消费者积极使用央行数字货币进行预付款支付,有利于实现智能合约赋能预付式市场的健康发展与稳定运行。

关键词: 智能合约, 央行数字货币(CBDC), 预付款监管, 演化博弈

Abstract:

[Objective] Under the perspective of payment choice, it is important to explore the strategy evolution rules of consumers, merchants, and the government at different stages of the prepaid consumption market of smart contract application, which is important for the long-term mechanism of preventing fund misappropriation and regulating the destination of funds. [Methods] Taking consumers’ prepaid payment method as the entry point, we constructed a three-party evolutionary game model among consumers, merchants, and the government, and simulated and analyzed the stability of the equilibrium strategy combinations of the game system as well as the influence relationship of the parameters by using Matlab 2021a. [Results] This paper shows that under different scenarios of smart contract application in the prepaid consumer market, the evolutionary system evolves and eventually stabilizes towards {traditional payment, no runaway, loose regulation}, {traditional payment, no runaway, strict regulation}, and {CBDC payment, no runaway, strict regulation}, respectively, and the simulation results further validate the stability of the equilibrium of the evolutionary equilibrium in different stages. [Conclusions] Government departments adopt more flexible and dynamic platform regulatory measures and guide consumers to actively use CBDC for prepaid payment, which is conducive to realizing the healthy development and stable operation of the smart contract-enabled prepaid market.

Key words: smart contracts, Central Bank Digital Currency(CBDC), prepayment regulation, evolutionary game